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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper documents some thoughts on the reform agenda in public transit that is 
occurring throughout the world. The specific focus is on the commitment to competitive 
regulation through competitive tendering, and the interest by a few governments to control 
the tangible assets used by private operators as a mechanism to exercise the opportunity if 
so desired to put previously private sector protected services out to competitive tender. 
The views presented herein are in part based on knowledge of what ensued in the 
Metropolitan Reform process in Sydney leading to the signing of contracts in 2005 and the 
focus of the 2006-07 reform program outside of the Sydney metropolitan area; and an 
appreciation of the evidence from around the world presented at the International 
Conference Series on Competition and Ownership of Land Passenger Transport, known as 
the Thredbo series (see Hensher 2005)1, as many jurisdictions have undertaken wide 
ranging reform of their public transport systems, especially bus and coach. The Thredbo 
series provides a rich array of real world experiences as many countries test the full gamut 
of procurement and funding models (Macario 2001, Norheim and Longva 2005, Preston 
2005, Preston and van de Velde 2002, Viegas and Macario 2001, van de Velde 2001, Van 
de Velde and Pruijmboom 2003 and van de Velde et al. 2005).  
 
We review theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on contracting regimes and asset 
ownership, and the role that government and operator might play in a setting in which 
building trusting and collaborative partnerships, within the context of formal procurement 
contracts, has merit in delivering services that are in the main funded from the public 
purse. The focus on cost efficiency and quality (or service effectiveness), and incentives to 
innovate as contractible and non-contractible elements, is key to the arguments.  
 
1.1  The Indisputable Strategic Objective of Government on 
behalf of Society 
 
The broad objective(s) of government might best be summarised as follows: to provide a 
good quality, integrated and continually improving transit service for a fair price, with reasonable 
return to operators that gives value for money under a regime of continuity. From an operator’s point of 
view, there should be no argument with this, provided there is industry buy-in and 
confidence in the procurement and continuing funding procedures. 
 
There are a lot of valuable signposts in this objective, focused on securing appropriate 
services for the community in the context of a trusting partnership between all stakeholders 
(especially the government and the service provider), mindful of the social and commercial 
imperatives that each stakeholder works towards, given each parties legally sanctioned 
contractual obligations. There is a strong recognition from the outset that the service 
provider (i.e., transit business) is a crucial input, but only one input, into the overall 
obligations of government to provide mobility and accessibility services to the community, 
that are consistent with value for money per taxpayer dollar.  
 
                                                 
1 Co-founded by David Hensher and the late Professor Michael Beesley, and now recognised globally as the premier 
conference on competition and ownership of land passenger transport. 
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Given the requirements to meet social obligations, there is the risk that social obligation gets 
misinterpreted as either delivering value for money (a popular phrase, defined so often as 
doing more with less), rather than the preferred definition (globally) of maximizing 
accessibility or net social benefit per dollar of government funding2. The latter is useful under all 
contractual arrangements since government still has substantial investment in the 
infrastructure and demand management of the system. Underlying this focus is recognition 
that building an efficient and effective supply chain of stakeholders in public transit 
provision requires a foundation strong in trust, with its distinct commitment to 
cooperation and collaboration. As far as we can tell, many jurisdictions have a way to go in 
connecting through a trust chain. 
 
1.2  Trust, Cooperation and Collaboration 
 
Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative 
behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of that community. There are 
two types of trust: thick and thin trust. Thick trust should be present when there is a set of 
complex intertwined relations covering many aspects of economic and social life. Thin 
trust involves more limited contractual relations; such as an exchange relationship in the 
market. Cooperation and collaboration are distinct levels of relationship (Golicic et al. 2003). 
Collaboration, which is a stronger magnitude than cooperation, involves decision making in 
an active capacity whilst sharing key information. Collaboration requires trust, integrity and 
reliability, which can help lead the relationship to grow stronger over time. 
 
Repetition leads to cooperation and collaboration and the by-product is trust. The evidence 
can be attributed to Professor Robert Oumann, a game theorist, who was awarded the 
2005 Nobel Prize in Economics. Oumann showed in his writings that repeated games, 
compared to a single game, leads to greater cooperation. An interpretation of this in the 
transit context, given the focus on efficient and effective continuity in the context of 
incomplete contracts, is the growing of partnership by building on relationships; something 
that is arguably relatively limiting with competitive tendering (especially short term 
contracts such as 5-7 years3), but reinforcing through negotiated PBC’s with incumbents 
and rules for non-compliance. Another way of viewing this is to think of it as “ironing out 
the wrinkles’ over time and moving forward with continuity in the delivery of efficient and 
effective services. Importantly, the trust building paradigm must exist within a framework 
that has clarity on the obligations under legal contracts; however we will argue below that it 
is the incompleteness of such contracts that makes for the case for combining trust and 
legal contracting obligations, rather than promoting one or the other4. 
 
                                                 
2 This phrasing avoids the ambiguity of subsidy since government is also investing in the system. 
3 We often are told that the incumbent tends to win back the tendered contract. If this is the case then why are we 
undertaking tendering instead of seeking out efficient solutions through negotiated performance-based contracts (see 
Hensher and Houghton 2004, 2005a)? 
4 It is true that there are plenty of examples of mistrust that leada  loss of performance (e.g., aspects of the UK rail 
regulatory regime and the operator collusion that occurred in France – see Yvrande-Billon, A. (2006) – the latter 
linked to lack of expertise within the public authorities); however this should not be read that the ‘solution’ lies in 
competitive tendering, but in a better aligned trust chain conditioned on clear contractual obligations, incentives and 
non-compliant conditions. 
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This links to the broader literature of transactions economics and costs, and property rights 
and the boundaries of a business, offers ideas on a range of contractual mechanisms for 
buying transparency, efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
1.3  Supporting efficiency and effectiveness through the life of a 
contract (and not at the time of tendering) 
 
The focus of any reform process must be on (cost) efficiency and (service) effectiveness,  
promoting continuously uniform competitive pressure through the life of a contract, with 
competitive tendering only one of a number of options, but an appropriate instrument for 
non-compliance under all regimes. In presenting the arguments, it is important to recognise 
that some elements of the efficiency-effectiveness dyad will be contractible, but many may 
be non-contractible; and it is often through the non-contractible dimension that we see 
innovation and benefit that is typically delivered better by private ownership than by 
government ownership of tangible and intangible assets. 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) provides a relevant framework within which to develop 
the arguments for the roles of the market and governance which is so central to the reform 
process. A transaction occurs when one stage of activity finishes and another begins. With 
a well-working interface, these transfers occur smoothly. TCE supplants the usual 
preoccupation with technology and distribution costs, with an examination of the 
comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task completion under alternative 
governance structures. It is as much about transactions within a single entity (e.g., one 
transit operator, a regulator) as it is between entities. It pays special attention to 
information signalling and processing and its asymmetry throughout the system (i.e., where 
the expertise really resides), bounded rationality (i.e., the ability to process a limited amount 
of information), hazard, opportunism and asset specificity (Williamson 1979). 
 
Importantly for any ongoing reform process, transaction cost economics maintains that it 
is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant bargaining action at the ex ante contracting 
stage (which is what competitive tendering essentially does; especially in the presence of 
inadequate ex post monitoring). Instead bargaining is pervasive, in which case the 
institutions of private ordering and the study of contracting in its entirety take on critical 
economic significance. Performance-based contracts (PBCs), which can be negotiated 
under an unambiguous condition of expected performance, align with this view (Hensher 
and Houghton 2004, 2005) since the market operates actively throughout the contract 
period, under signals delivered through incentive payments and benchmarked efficiency – 
or what is known as yardstick competition. The behavioural attributes of human agents, 
whereby conditions of bounded rationality (‘doing what each party is best at’ i.e., 
specialisation) and opportunism (e.g., ‘looking for appropriate opportunities to grow 
patronage’) are joined, and the complex attributes of transaction with special reference to 
the condition of asset specificity, are responsible for this condition (Williamson 1987, 178). 
Alignment of incentives is central to efficient contracts and property rights. The latter emphasises that 
ownership matters, with rights of ownership of an asset (tangible and intangible assets) 
defined as the rights to use the asset, the right to appropriate returns from the asset, and 
the right to change the form and/or substance of an asset.  
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Transaction cost economics acknowledges merit in both monopoly and efficient risk-
bearing approaches to contracting. It insists, however, that efficiency and effectiveness 
purposes are sometimes served by restraints on trade (Williamson 1987, 188). This 
statement is crucial to the discussion, because it puts forth the argument that examination 
of the underlying attributes of transactions discloses that restraints on trade can help to 
safeguard the integrity of transactions when transit operator-specific investments are at 
hazard, with downside consequences on service delivery. 
 
1.4  Asset Ownership – a key issue linked to the boundaries of a 
transit operator’s business 
 
The relationship between asset ownership and incentives is an important kernel of the 
debate in some reform processes. What we are seeing in Sydney in particular, where assets 
are currently owned by private transit operators5 is a position of progressively relinquishing 
ownership of  tangible assets (vehicles in particular) through new financial arrangements 
when assets are being replaced, opening up in time, (potentially) to competitive tendering. 
If an incumbent operator is cost efficient and service quality effective, what does this do to 
incentives to invest and grow the business6? And what incentives are provided by 
competitively tendered management contracts, as for example in Adelaide and Perth in 
Australia (Hensher and Wallis 2005), where one is starting with a ‘clean slate’ in the sense 
of no initial private incumbents?7 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) can assist in addressing the question of 
what determines business boundaries. The basic tenets of the property rights framework 
can be usefully discussed in terms of an arrangement between a principal (i.e., the 
government) and an agent (i.e., the transit operator) hired to accomplish some task. As 
principal-agent theory has long argued, appropriate incentives must be provided for the 
agent. In general, because the principal cannot directly measure the effort level of the 
agent, incentives need to be provided by making the agent's remuneration partially 
contingent on benchmarked performance. An example is the incentive payment that a 
transit operator might receive from improved service quality. A basic conclusion of the 
theory is that agency problems can be mitigated, and sometimes even solved, by offering 
the agent a sufficient share of the output (i.e., rewards) produced, commensurate with the 
risks they take and an agreed margin.  
                                                 
5 Often with assumed Grandfather’s rights. 
6 I am reminded of what happens when a private plumber as a service provider services one’s hot water system. One 
does not argue that the equipment he uses, which I am paying for in part, belongs to me. It is capitalized in the price 
charged and he keeps the equipment. So why should not the cost of a transit service provided by an operator be 
treated the same (as the cost of providing a service), with the service charged back to the government through a 
funding model? Indeed even if one goes to competitive tendering, this should apply.  
7 The Adelaide and Perth success under competitively tendered management contracts appears to be due in the 
main to the patronage and service incentive payment schemes and not tendering per se (except in the initial round of 
moving from public to private service provision). It is also noteworthy in a growing number of countries that the 
average number of bidders is declining. For example, the average number of bids per route tender in London is 
currently 3 but was 4.5 in the late 1990s. One would expect more interest in less risky route-based contracts. For 
area wide contracts in New Zealand the average number of bids is 1.2 with the incumbent winning nearly 90 percent 
of the contracts. 
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However, problems arise when it is not possible to specify clear performance measures in 
advance (i.e., a poorly structured contract that does not build in clear performance 
benchmarks and agreed variations). For instance, the government may have insufficient 
information to pre-specify the decision-making activities of the transit operator; after all, 
that's presumably what they were hired to do. The solution prescribed by agency theory 
calls for a comprehensive contract that considers the marginal value of all possible activities of 
the transit operator and the marginal cost to the transit operator in all possible states of the 
world, such as innovative improvements, and the ability of government to commit to pay 
the appropriate compensation for each outcome (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). Lacking 
such a comprehensive contract, incentives, and therefore production, will be sub-optimal. 
Rich economic theory has emerged in recent years that combines the insights of transaction 
cost economics on the importance of bounded rationality and contracting costs with the 
rigour of agency theory. The theory focuses on the way different structures assign property 
rights to resolve the issues that arise when contracts are incomplete. This provides a basis 
for defining different organisational structures by the ownership and control of key assets. 
Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM - Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) 
pioneered this approach, and its relationship to earlier approaches has been lucidly 
documented by Hart (1989). 
A key tenet of the GHM approach is that, unlike the contracts typically analysed by agency 
theory, real world contracts are almost always "incomplete", in the sense that there are 
inevitably some circumstances or contingencies that are left out of the contract, because 
they were either unforeseen or simply too complex and/or expensive to enumerate in 
sufficient detail. Schliefer (1998) broadly describes all non-contractible elements as 
"quality", which in the transit case may include innovation, planning expertise, driver 
attitude and manners, vehicle cleanliness, etc. Incompleteness is a natural consequence of 
the bounded rationality of the parties. 
 
Each of the parties will have certain rights under the contract, but its incompleteness 
means that there will remain some "residual rights" that are not specified in the contract. 
When these rights pertain to the use of an asset, the institution which allocates these residual rights 
of control is referred to as property ownership. All rights to the asset not expressly 
assigned in the contract accrue to the person called the "owner" of the asset. For example, 
if a bus purchase contract says nothing about its maintenance protocol, then it is the transit 
owner who retains the right to decide on the level of investment (which may not be 
optimal). 
The allocation of the residual rights of control will have an important effect on the 
bargaining position of the parties to the contract after they have made investments in their 
relationship. In the absence of comprehensive contracts, property rights largely determine 
which ex post bargaining positions will prevail. What we are seeing in Sydney is a very 
explicit allocation of property rights moving towards Government. Is this likely to be a 
trend or has Sydney got it wrong? In particular, a party that owns at least some of the 
investment in the asset will be in a position to reap at least some of benefits from the 
relationship that were not explicitly allocated in the contract, by threatening to withhold the 
assets otherwise8. A party who does not control any assets must rely on the letter of the 
                                                 
8 Operators in Sydney have to apply to the Government for permission to purchase new vehicles, and the 
Government will decide if this is supported. The operator will then offer quotes from suppliers, and the Government 
will choose one and provide funding over the life of the asset. The asset life is government determined, in contrast to 
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contract or the goodwill of the asset owner to share in the output. As a result, an agent 
who controls no assets risks going unpaid for all effort not explicitly described in a 
contract9. In contrast, the agent who controls assets that are essential to the relationship 
can "veto" any allocation of the residual rewards not considered sufficiently favourable. 
Thus, the ownership of assets and the receipt of any residual income stream go hand in 
hand.  
Ownership matters when an organisation makes specific investments (Williamson 1975, 
1985) and where contract incompleteness leads to distorted ex ante investments (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986). Grossman and Hart show that the agent whose ex ante investment is 
‘essential’ to making the most productive use of an asset should own it.  Hart and Moore 
(1990) suggest that an asset should be owned by an agent, or a coalition containing the 
agent, who is indispensable to the asset (i.e. without their participation the asset has no effect 
on the marginal benefit of others).  They further argue that an agent who is dispensable 
should have no ownership rights over assets.  
Efficient ownership would seem to depend both on where the investment is taking place 
and which is the indispensable party.  Could there be a case for Government ownership of 
the physical assets if Government is either the party that undertakes all ‘essential’ 
investment (with operators therefore dispensable) or the party viewed as indispensable?  
Schliefer (1998, 137) point out that GMH theory does not model Government 
participation specifically, and goes on to demonstrate that Government ownership is rarely 
the most efficient at providing ‘essential’ investment in non-contractible elements.  Public 
managers have relatively weak incentives to make ‘essential’ investments (particularly 
innovation) as they are not the owner and will receive only a fraction of the returns.  
Schliefer (1998, 138) argues that the question of ownership in the Government context is 
rather one of whether high-powered (market) incentives are appropriate to the 
procurement context. 
Schliefer (1998) outlines a small subset of cases where low-powered incentives (provided 
by Government ownership), such as legal rules on compensation of bureaucrats, 
complexity of government objectives and public setting rules (which reduce the return to 
public managers), are more appropriate when private ownership would otherwise lead to 
excessive cost reduction10, to the detriment of non-contractible quality.  Private ownership 
                                                                                                                                               
allowing an operator to determine the write off period according to the financial state of their business. A related 
matter that arises when determining the cost of capital is the opportunity that exists for either party to recognise ways 
in which one party might have a comparative advantage in the ability to raise capital to fund assets. This will depend 
on the performance rating of a specific government (AAA etc.), the taxation regimes in place for private and public 
sector loans and interest rate cycles. Importantly, the source of funds can be treated in such  a  way that the party 
best placed to get the most attractive financial deal for the sector can then make the assets available to the operator 
(unless the operator is the best financier), at an agreed price, without having ownership transfer along the lines being 
implemented in Sydney. 
9 Hart and Moore (1990) show that this provides incentives to act in the asset owner’s interests. 
10 For example, when a private operator does not invest in service planning and employs lower quality tangible and 
intangible assets. The 'power' of incentives must be looked at in 2 dimensions: Current income - Flat fee (lowest) 
through to entirely performance-based (highest); and Future income - No chance of losing contract (lowest) through 
to certainty that contract will be lost if performance is in any way sub-standard (highest). This is more complicated 
where bonuses or contract renewal depend on the subjective assessment of the principal.  These incentives are 
generally considered to be relatively low-powered (if performance criteria are unknown they are ignored, although 
you would expect the agent to have some idea). We certainly see subjective assessment in the Sydney contracts 
(e.g. operators are required to "work cooperatively with neighbouring service providers" - how is this assessed?). In 
the bus context, government ownership provides low powered incentives as there is little threat of termination and 
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is, however, generally considered superior even where there is strong incentive to sacrifice 
quality for cost savings for three reasons: gains from innovation through private ownership 
may outweigh the negative effects of cost pressures; where there is competition (especially 
with the car), demand influences quality as well as costs; where there are repeat transactions 
the reputational effect tends to negate cost pressures.  Schliefer does not consider public 
transit as a case requiring low-powered incentives through Government ownership. High-
powered incentives embedded in Performance Based Contracts (PBC’s, see Hensher and 
Houghton 2005) such as patronage and service incentives can provide the incentives for an 
efficient outcome. 
Our focus has been on physical assets (e.g., vehicles) despite the fact that 'essential', specific 
investment in the transit industry is more likely to involve intangible human assets (e.g., 
information, experience, skills). Simon (1982) has long argued for a greater emphasis on 
these intangible assets: 
“My central theme has been that the main productive resource in an economy 
are programs -- skills, if you prefer -- that in the past have been partly frozen 
into the design of machines, but largely stored in the minds of men.” 
Given the continuing information explosion, the role of "intellectual capital" is becoming 
more significant. As Drucker (1992) put it:  
In this society, knowledge is the primary resource for individuals and for the 
economy overall. Land, labor and capital -- the economist's traditional factors 
of production -- do not disappear, but they become secondary. 
Hart and Moore (1990) show that control over a physical asset can lead indirectly to 
control over human assets, where the owner exercises their ability to exclude others from 
the use of that asset.  The owners of the human assets are provided with incentive to act in 
the owner’s interest in order to make use of their asset-specific, human investment.  
Schliefer (1998) emphasises, however, that Government ownership of any kind of asset is 
usually inefficient. Given the interdependence between tangible and intangible assets across 
the full spectrum of contractible and non-contractible activity, if you take the ownership of 
contractible tangible assets away from the private sector, we engender higher risks of 
malfunctioning (also see footnote 8), especially where there is a sizeable amount of non-
contractible quality.  
In summary, a specific asset should be owned by the organisation that can use it most 
productively. Importantly it is the interaction of contractibility with the need to provide 
incentives via asset ownership that defines the costs and benefits of market coordination. 
Government ownership is rarely efficient, and private ownership with appropriate 
performance incentives can provide the least distortion to ex ante investment incentives. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
current income is often not related to performance. For private operators, examples of contractual elements that 
contribute to the overall 'power' of the contract include: contract length (longer contract, lower powered), relative size 
of performance payments (less performance-based, lower powered), KPIs and other explicit measures of 
performance(less extensive, lower powered), contract renewal clauses (automatic renewal, lower powered), clauses 
relating to the transfer of private information (easier to hide poor performance, lower powered), clauses relating to 
termination/replacement with another operator (harder for principal to terminate contract, lower powered). 
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2.  Conclusions 
 
This paper offers some alternative perspectives on the role that government and operator 
might play in the future in the delivery of transit services. In particular, we are of the view 
that efficient and effective services can be provided under a carefully crafted regulatory 
framework that provides appropriate competitive pressures which does not necessarily 
require competitive tendering to deliver the appropriate outcomes.  
 
This can be achieved under a strong continuing trusting partnership through negotiated 
performance-based partnerships that have strict rules on commercial relationships and 
deliverables. As part of a program of reform to achieve these ideals, the matter of property 
rights and incentives form the backbone of establishing a framework capable of meeting 
the obligations of all parties.  
 
It is possible to build a quality trusting partnership with well defined commercial 
(contracted) obligations; however the contracting process will always be incomplete in 
practice, and hence there is a need to recognise that the contribution of each party in a 
service delivery chain requires close cooperation and collaboration. Continuity of compliant 
contracts is one important way of ensuring this. 
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